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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGES. RING\VOOD, HAROLD
T. RINGWOOD, LUELLA DUNCAN and ESTHER JANE OSWALD,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.
8073

vs.
LOTTIE S. BRADFORD, also known
as Lottie Bradford White,
Defendant.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant
STATE11:ENT OF FACTS
The defendant and appellant is the owner in fee of
certain real property situated in Emigration Canyon,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R-94, D-Abstract.
Plaintiffs and Respondents are the owners in fee of certain real property immediately Westerly of and contiguous to the property owned by appellant. R-94, P-1.
Appellant's predecessors in title acquired their property
about the year 1934. Appellant acquired her property
1
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about 1946, and she is the present owner. R-D4, D Abstract. Respondents' predecessors in title acquired their
property about the year 1924. R-62-63, 94, P-2. Respondents acquired their property from their predecessors about 1946. R-94, P ex. 2. The calls in the deeds to
the property of the respective parties show that the westerly boundary of appellant's property coincides with the
easterly boundary of the respondent's property. R-94,
P ex. 1, D Abstract. The property which is the subject of
this dispute is a triangular piece, bounded on the West
by a fence, on the East by the common line referred to
above and on the North by part of the line which would
appear from the deed calls to partially bound the respondent's property on the North. At the South, the
West and East boundaries of the disputed portion almost
intersect at the Southwest corner of appellant's property
and the Southeast corner of Respondents' property. Said
disputed portion is described as follows and contains
.0897 acres :
Beginning at a point North 1095.16 feet and East
1223.37 feet from the Southwest Corner of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 32, Township 1
North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 183.97 feet to intersection of
an old fence line; thence follo\ving said fence line
North 14°-09' West 173.78 feet; thence North
70° -00' East 45.21 feet to beginning. R-94, D-ex. 10.
The fence has bounded this property on the West
for about 27 years. R-60, 61. The shape of the property
and the location of the fence and appellant's cabin is
shown best in defendant's exhibit D-10.
2
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Appellant's predecessor in title was her daughter
\vho was also one of the witnesses at the trial, Margaret
Bradford Pitts. R44. Respondents' predecessors in title
were their parents, now both deceased. Actually appellant's husband was given the property for work he had
done and he in turn had given it to his daughter. R-47, 48.
He is also now deceased.
When Margaret Bradford Pitts acquired title to appellant's property, the fence in question was already in
existence and was apparently assumed to be the boundary
line between the Ringwood and the Bradford property.
R-45, 46, 52, 54, 57. Such being the case in 1934, the Bradfords built their cabin near the fence line, said location
being the most favorable spot in which to build a cabin
on 'vhat was assumed to be the Bradford property. R-46,
47, 52. As a matter of fact, the cabin was constructed almost entirely on the disputed piece of property. That
same cabin has existed in its same location ever since
its original construction. R-51, 52. The fence has also
always existed in its present location, only 4.7 feet to 7.3
feet from the cabin. R-51, R-94-D ex. 10. At the time the
Bradfords acquired the property and built their cabin,
the fence line was adopted and thought of as the boundary between the Bradford and the Ringwood property.
R-64, 52, 54. Ever since the Bradford cabin was built,
the Bradford family have occupied their cabin and property up to the fence line. R-27, 28, 46. The Ringwood
family on the other hand, have never attempted to occupy
nor possess any of the property East of the fence line.
R-46-76. They have never made any claim to property
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East of the fence, and have tacitly acquiesced in and
recognized the fence-line as the boundary line. R-5:2, 37.
It was only when the Ringwoods decided to sell their
property that they had a survey made and discovered
that the fence and cabin was ostensibly on the Ringwood
property. R-27, 52. This survey was conducted about
the year 1951. R23-. From 1934 to the present time the
parties hereto and their respective families and predecessors in title have occupied their respective premises
up to the fence-line. R-23, 27, 44, 50. No one ever questioned that the fence was not the boundary line until the
present dispute arose. R-46, 52. There is evidence of a
conversation between the elder 1\fr. Bradford and Harold
Ringwood, one of the Respondents, to the effect that the
fence was considered the boundary. R-57. This claim was
never contested nor disputed. R-47, 76.
Witnesses for the Respondent testified that the fence
was originally built for the purpose of keeping sheep out
of the Ringwood property. R-61. However, the Ringwoods admit that they never attempted to occupy East
of the fenceline, that they were familiar with the fence
and Bradford cabin and that they were aware of the
Bradford occupancy. R-:25, 27, 70, 75. It was not until
the present dispute arose that the Ringwoods ever asserted any claim to property East of the fenceline. R-27,
32, 57.
Respondents acquired their property from their
mother about 1946. R-94, P ex. 1. The parents and the
4
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children frequently visited the Ringwood property and
were undoubtedly aware of the situation and location of
the Bradford cabin and the fence-line in question. R-25,
27, 75. The respondents, as children of the elder Ring\voods, frequently visited the property and even stayed
there from time to time. R-27. During all the 18 years
prior to this dispute, some members of each of the families have visited the properties, and there has never been
any question as to the true boundary. R-47, 76.
There is some evidence that the Ringwood family
suspected that the fenceline was not the true boundary.
George Ringwood, one of the respondents testified that
one Fisher had surveyed the Ringwood property nearly
twenty years ago. However, there is no evidence that he
or any of the Ringwood family took steps to make this
known to the appellant. They merely kept silent and continued to acquiesce in the fence as the boundary line.
R-76.

This action was commenced by plaintiffs and respondents against the defendant and appellant as an action in ejectment and for damages for the wrongful detention of the disputed property. R-1. Their claim for damages was waived at the beginning of the trial. R-17. The
defendant and appellant counter-claimed, claiming the
disputed property under the theory of the doctrine of acquiescence. R-3, 6. The trial court found the issues on
plaintiffs' complaint in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and on defendant's counter-claim, the court
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found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendant. R-80.
The trial court found that the respondents are the
owners of in fee of the property subject to this dispute,
that the appellant is the owner of the real property immediately to the east of said property, that the appellant's cabin has stood and does stand wrongfully upon the
premises of the respondent, that the cabin of appellant
was resting upon respondents' property, that said fence
was not used or intended as a boundary fence by the
respondent nor their predecessors, and , that the respondents were entitled to judgment requiring appellants
to remove her cabin from the said property. The court
decreed that appellant should remove her cabin from
said property within 30 days from entry of the decree.
R-83, 84, 85, 86.
From the foregoing findings and decree, the defendant and appellant now brings this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
1. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
FOUND THAT SAID FENCE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE
APPELLANT'S AND RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY
BY THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT SAID FENCE WAS NOT USED
OR INTENDED AS A BOUNDARY FENCE BY THE
PLAINTIFF RESPONDENTS.
6
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
That the trial court should have found that said
fence has been established as the boundary between the
appellant's and respondents' property by the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence. That the trial court erred
in finding that said fence was not used or intended as a
boundary fence by plaintiff respondents.
As appears from the record, the appellant and respondents have lived peaceably on their respective properties as neighbors for approximately 18 years. During
all of this time, the cabin of appellants has remained in
its present location just a. few feet from the fence. The
appellant contends that the fence has been adopted and
acquiesced in as the boundary line between appellant and
respondents property. It has existed in its present location for more than twenty five years. Until the present
dispute arose, neither respondents nor their predecessors
in title have claimed that the fence-line was not the true
boundary line. The respondents have not actually or
constructively occupied nor did they attempt to occupy
east of the fence-line. They made no claim to the triangular piece of property subject of this dispute. Their
conduct has always been consistent with recognition of
the fence as the boundary line. They have acquiesced in
the fence as the boundary line for 18 years. Such being
the case, appellant contends that the case comes within
the doctrine of "boundary by acquiescence".
,_

'
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This doctrine has been long established within the
State of Utah and is well stated in the leading ease of
Brown vs. Milliner, 232 Pac. 2nd 202, (Ut. 1951).
In that case plaintiff sued to quiet title to certain
property and defendants counterclaimed on the doctrine
of boundary acquiescence. Defendants had occupied the
disputed portion for about forty years. However, the
evidence showed that there was some joint user of the
land by both parties. Plaintiff's conduct was always consistent with ownership of the disputed portion. In upholding the judgment of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff, this court said:
'' ... It has long been recognized in this state that
when the location of the true boundary between
two adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain
or in dispute, the owners thereof may by parol
agreement, establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees
( Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U t. 99, 107 Pac. 25;
Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Ut. 57, 276 Pac. 912). In the
latter case, this court pointed out that when the
location of the true boundary is known to the adjoining owners any parol agreement between them
establishing the boundary elsewhere would be an
attempt to transfer an interest in realty without
complying with the statute of frauds, but we
stated, if the location is not kno,vn to the adjoining
owners, a parol agreement between them fixing its
location is not regarded as transferring an interest in land, but merely determining the location of exisiting estates ... ".
The court further states in the Brown vs. 1Iilliner
case citing the case of Tripp vs. Bagley:
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" ... the Tripp case does not require a party relying upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in
for a long period of time to produce evidence that
the location of the true boundary was ever known,
uncertain or ·in dispute. That the true boundary
was uncertain or indispute and that the parties
agreed upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line will be implied from the parties' acquiescence.''
The difference between the instant case and the
Brown case is that in this case respondents conduct is
not consistent with ownership. Until this dispute arose,
respondents did no act nor said no word which would
imply that they claimed the disputed portion. For 18
years they acquiesced in the fence-line as the boundary.
And all this time respondents were aware of the fact
appellant and her predecessors were actively occupying
the disputed portion up to the fence-line.
The reason for this doctrine is expressed in the case
of Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 Pac. 2nd 205 (Ut. 1951). In that
case a common grantor owned certain property. He
erected a fence between two lots and conveyed the two
lots to plaintiff's and defendant's successors. Plaintiff
sued to quiet title up to a fence-line, basing his case upon
the doctrine of acquiescence. The record showed that
defendant's father and predecessor helped reconstruct
the fence in 1927. He conveyed to defendent in 1935.
Fourteen year later, defendant asserted ownership to the
disputed land. The court found acquiescence for only
eight years and gave judgment in favor of plaintiff. In
affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of
9
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plaintiff, this court well stated the reasoning and theory
upon which this doctrine rests, as follows :
''. . . This is so because the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence rests upon so"und public policy of
avoiding trouble and litigation over boundaries."
And in the case of Blanchard vs. Smith, 255 Pac.
2nd 729 (Utah), this court said:
"Our conclusions have been predicated on a principal of repose designed to set at rest boundaries
commonly the subject of strife.''
The Brown vs. Milliner case says citing the case of
Glenn vs. Whitney, 209 Pac. 2nd 257 (Ut. 1949):
'' ... that the rule is bottomed on the fiction that
at some time in the past, the adjoining owners
were in dispute or uncertain as to the location of
the true boundary and that they compromised
their differences by agreeing upon the recognized
boundary as the dividing line between the properties.''
The case of Holmes vs. Judge, 31 Ut. 269, 87 Pac.
1009, was an action to quiet title to real property by plaintiff, in which defendant counterclaimed claiming under
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. A fence separated the properties of the parties for about 30 years
prior to suit. During this period the evidence showed that
the children of both of the original owners had lived upon
the properties when quite small, thus leaving the inference that the families of the owners lived there for many
years at least, and thus not only acquiesced in, but must
have recognized the fence as the boundary. It was open
10
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and visible for all those years and no one raised any
question respecting the boundary or that the fence did not
constitute the true division line until the respondent
plaintiff brought the action. At the trial plaintiff was
granted judgment and defendant appealed. This court
reversed the trial court and said citing the case of B aidtv in vs. Brown, 16 N.Y. 363, in reference to implied agreements establishing a boundary line :
''The supposition of such an agreement in cases
of long acquiescence in an established line is, as I
apprehend, entirely superfluous. The acquiescence in such cases affords ground, not merely for
an inference of fact to go to the jury as evidence
of an original parol agreement, but for a direct
legal inference as to the true boundary line. It is
held proof of so conclusive a nature that the party
is precluded from offering any evidence to the
contrary ... ''
Accordingly, the silence of the respondents for these
18 years should be entitled to great weight. After sleeping on their rights for such a long period of years, they
should not now be heard to say that they never recognized
the fence-line as the boundary.
The Holmes case continues as follows:
" ... It is squarely held, however, that long acquiescence in a boundary that is visibly marked, or
placed where it can be observed by the adjoining
owner, is sufficient to establish a boundary from
which neither party may depart at will.''
And quoting Judge Cooley in the case of Diehl vs.
Zanger, 39 Mich. 601, the Holmes case continues:
11
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"But another view should have been equally conclusive in this case. The long practical acquiescence of the parties concerned in the supposed
boundary lines should be regarded as such an
agreement upon them as to be conclusive, even
if originally located erroneously.''
Then citing the case of Husted vs. Willoughby,
75 N.W. 279:
'' ... The same court held that, where a boundary
line was located by mistake by one party and acquiesced in for more than 15 years, such boundary
will not be disturbed. ''
Further citing the Holmes case:
''. . . Counsel for respondent, however contend
that the improvements and fence were erected by
tenants and that the owners are not to be bound
by the acts of such tenants. Grant this and there
remains the fact that the owners and their successors and grantees by implication of law adopted
the acts of those tenants by acquiescence therein
for more than 30 years.''
'' ... While as all the authorities agree, no hard
and fast rule can be laid down to control in every
case, but that each case must be determined by its
own peculiar facts and circumstances, still where,
as in this case, the facts respecting the acquiescence for so many years, and the open and visible
boundary so clearly established, and the knowledge thereof by interested parties is so clearly
shown, the general principles recognized by all
authorities apply with full force, and we cannot
do otherwise than to give them effect. We do not
'vish to be understood as holding that parties may
not claim to the true boundary, were an assumed

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or agreed boundary is located through mistake or
inadvertence, or were it is clear that the line as
located was not intended as a boundary, and where
a boundary so located has not been acquiesced in
for a long term of years by the parties in interest.
But in all cases where the boundary is open and
visibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings,
and is knowingly acquieseed in for a term of years,
the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, and will not permit the parties or
their grantees to depart from such line .
. . . While the interest of society require that the
title to real estate shall not be transferred from
the owner for slight cause, or otherwise than by
law, these same interest demand that there shall
be stability in boundaries, and that, where parties
for a long term of years acquiesced in certain line
between their own and neighbor's property, they
will not thereafter be permitted to say that what
they permitted to appear as being established by
and with their consent and agreement was in
fact false. ' '
In the instant case we have a fence which was adopted and established as a boundary line 18 years ago and
nothing but silence has been heard from the respondents
and their predecessors in all that time. The evidence
clearly shows that respondents were aware of the location of the fence and appellant's cabin. The fenee was
open and visible and clearly established for respondents
to observe and as respondents readily admit. Certainly
they permitted the fence-line to appear as being established as the boundary line. They should not now be
allowed to be heard to say that the fence-line was not acquiesced in as the boundary line. And their silence and
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inactivity must be considered as acquiescence within the
meaning of the doctrine, even though the trial court must
have overlooked this fact.
Furthermore, the instant case is a family situation
much the same as in the Holmes case. Members of both
the Ringwood and the Bradford families either lived
upon or frequently visited their respective properties.
It must be presumed that the families must have not only
acquiesced in, but must have recognized the fence as the
boundary line. The fence-line was open and visible for
all those 18 years, as was the location of the appellant's
cabin, and was not questioned as the true division line
until respondents brought this action.
Furthermore, the acquiescence in this case is much
longer than the minimum period required under the hold~
ing of Ekberg vs. Bates, cited above. On this point,
that case says:
"The length of time necessary to establish a
boundary line by acquiescence has never been
established in this jurisdiction. Each case must
usually be determined on its own facts. In other
jurisdictions there have been statements which
indicate that the length of time should be at least
that prescribed by the statute of limitations. In
the instant case as we have pointed out above,
there was a period of actual acquiescence for more
than seven years before appellant acquired title
and under all the circumstances shown herein that
was sufficient length of time to establish the line
so that appellants are precluded from claiming
that it is not the true line.''
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In the case at hand, the acquiescence has existed for
a very minimum of 18 years. Add or take away a few
years, one way of another, would not significantly change
the fact of acquiescence in this case.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion appellant respectfully submits that this
court should enter its order reversing the District Court
and should set aside its Findings, Conclusions and Decree
and enter as its final judgment a decree quieting title to
the disputed portion of real property in the appellant
and against the respondents on the grounds that the subject fence-line has been established as the boundary line
betwen appellant's and respondents' property by their
mutual acquiescence therein.
The fence involved herein was established and adopted as the boundary line between the properties when appellant's predecessors built their cabin in 1934. The appellant and her predecessors have always actively and
physically occupied and claimed up to the fence-line
from the time the cabin was built to the time this dispute
arose in 1952. Respondents knew that appellant and her
predecessors were claiming and occupying up to the
fence-line. Respondents admit that they did not attempt
to question the occupancy of appellant nor did they do
anything consistent with claiming ownership to the disputed property. Assuming that the fence was not originally erected with the view of it being the boundary
line, it was so established and adopted by both parties
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when appellant's cabin was built only three to seven feet
East of the fence-line. The fence was openly visible and
the boundary was plainly marked. The respondents admit familiarity with the fence and appellant's cabin and
their respective locations. For 18 years they acquiesced
in this boundary which they would now have the courts
unsettle which is contrary to our public policy to unsettle
long established boundaries. The respondents and their
predecessors have slept on their rights for this long
period of years and should now be estopped from claiming that the fence-line is not the boundary line.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. GIBSON,
Attorney for Appellant.
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